“I0I00I0II…Me, digital?” Anthropological and identity-theoretical perspectives on mind-uploading
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Abstract
The idea of so-called mind-uploading envisions that, in the future, we will be able to transfer consciousness to artificial bodies or digital structures thanks to technological progress. What theory of consciousness and what mind-body relationship are presupposed in this vision? What problems of human identity could arise? In this article I will explore these questions. I will mainly argue two points: First, that mind-uploading is associated with a controversial theory of the mind and second, that the essential role of our bodily constitution for our mental life is being disregarded. Mind-uploading works with a truncated and simplified anthropology that does not do justice to the complexity of our biological, psychological and social constitution.
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